Will Globalization Sink the Navy? by Wirtz, James J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2002
Will Globalization Sink the Navy?
Wirtz, James J.
Globalization and Maritime Power, Chapter 30
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44038
Chapter 30
Will Globalization Sink the Navy?
James J. Wirtz
The September 11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have
provided a new context for reassessing the relationship between globalization,
naval strategy, and U.S. foreign and defense policy. This reassessment suggests
that despite the opportunities created by globalization for the U.S. Navy, strategic
thinking became moribund, or at best focused on simply preserving funding and
force structure, in the aftermath of the Cold War. September 11, however,
suggests that globalization and the information revolution have produced more
than prosperity and democratization. The same trends that have empowered
people of good will also have empowered global actors with sinister ambitions
and objectives. The rise of a new transnational threat to the United States has
created the need for new thinking about how the Navy can better protect
America. There is a need for a new vision of the Navy role in homeland defense.
National security requirements have created a real demand for naval
strategy—not simply the budget and program-justifying briefings that have passed
for official naval thought in recent years.1
To explain why the need for naval strategy now exists, this chapter first describes
the opportunities and challenges that shaped U.S. Navy policy and planning
during the last decade. It then explains why much current thinking about Navy
strategy has been overtaken by recent events. The chapter also identifies the
forces that have conspired to challenge Navy dominance of the world’s oceans. It
then suggests several ideas that Navy strategists might consider as they respond to
the challenges posed by the emergence of new global mediums of
communication.
A View from the Roaring ’90s
Our global age is a naval age. Previous chapters have provided ample evidence of
that. But instead of pleasing Navy officers, this bumper sticker statement and the
ideas behind it often made these officers uneasy during the 1990s. Globalization
complicated their attempts to explain the Navy contribution toward preserving
American security in the aftermath of the Cold War. Globalization implies peace,
or at least a set of market and strategic conditions that allows trade, commerce,
and travel to proceed without fear of war or a nagging apprehension about what
might happen next.2 Globalization also implies an absence of a blue-water naval
threat; for the indefinite future there is no prospect of a grand engagement such
as the battles of Midway, Jutland, or Trafalgar. In an age of globalization,
traditional methods of justifying naval force structure based on numbers of capital
ships, or the potential air, naval, and land threat posed by competing great
powers, are useless. New measures of effectiveness and depictions of the threat
have to be devised to generate public and legislative support for what is in fact an
extraordinarily expensive and ambitious enterprise: maintenance of a global and
dominant naval presence.
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Depicting a threat in the age of globalization, however, is no small matter,
especially for an organization that relies on tradition as a guide to its operations,
planning, and procurement.3 Globalization itself implies that security threats are
relatively minor and are receding. If prosperity leads to peace and if peace is the
natural order of things, as many people mistakenly believe, what role does a
global navy play in maintaining the status quo? Is a global navy sailing the seven
seas simply a vestige of the bad old past? Would it be better for the Navy to
abandon the wear and tear involved in maintaining forward presence and spend
more time tied up to the dock?4
The effort to answer these questions created a great deal of heartburn for
admirals and their staffs, especially as defense budgets remained stagnant after a
sharp decline at the end of the Cold War. A variety of studies were launched to
demonstrate how forward-deployed naval forces contributed to U.S. political and
economic objectives.5 The strategy of forward presence itself became a
centerpiece of naval strategy not only because it made sense (a navy tied up to
the dock is not much good to anyone) but also because it helped justify force
structure (it takes at least three ships in the pipeline to maintain one operating
forward).6 Many strategists, however, also recognized that the organizational,
doctrinal, and political problems that globalization created for the Navy were only
part of the story. Globalization has produced real strategic opportunities during
what amounts to a golden age for naval power. A global age is a naval age
because the threats to U.S. security are relatively small, difficult to predict, and
materialize quickly.7 In other words, the kinds of military threats encountered in a
naval age are right-sized for a forward-deployed carrier battlegroup or Marine
amphibious ready group. Also, if naval units happen not to be in the right spot at
the right time, they can probably arrive faster on the scene of a crisis than
significant Army or Air Force combat units—particularly, as we have seen in
Afghanistan, in the absence of available land bases.
Of course, the Navy and Marines needed to continue to engage in technological
and doctrinal transformation to increase the firepower, accuracy, and range of
their weapons in order to project power ashore. But in a global age, a carrier
battlegroup combined with Marine units that can operate virtually anywhere
while using organic logistics can have a major influence on most events on land.
If these forward-deployed naval units cannot bring a conflict to a speedy
conclusion, then they can contain the situation until the rest of the Navy, Army,
and Air Force arrive.
Even more important than the apparent fit between naval capabilities and
conventional threats is the link between globalization, economic prosperity, and
the U.S. Navy. As discussed in the first chapter and elsewhere in the current
volume, globalization and the strategic thinking articulated by Alfred Thayer
Mahan go hand in hand.8 Mahan’s vision of a United States growing rich from its
ability to use the seas as a means of communication fits well with contemporary
thinking about how the information revolution has facilitated international
commerce, contacts among individuals, and cultural exchange. The Navy plays a
critical role in the process of globalization because it controls access to the
world’s primary means of communication (ocean transportation) and, by
implication, access to global resources and markets. The Navy guarantees that the
United States, its allies, and its friends will have access to the wealth produced by
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global trade among market economies. The Navy helps to create and maintain the
political, commercial, and security conditions necessary for globalization to
occur. The Navy patrols and protects the sea lines of communication/commerce
that spread democracy and create global markets.
Despite plenty of hand wringing about the proliferation of antiaccess technologies
and strategies, the greatest challenges that faced the U.S. Navy at the turn of the
21st century appeared to be a disinterested American public and a new
Republican administration that sought to shed what it saw as its predecessor’s
excessive overseas commitments. Navy strategy documents in this period thus
dwelled not on issues of true strategy, but instead upon reiterating basic ideas
about what a navy can do (for example, navies are more useful at sea, not in port;
the United States depends upon maritime trade; forward-deployed forces can
respond quickly to crises).9 To preserve its force structure in an age of
globalization, the overriding goal of naval strategy was to win the hearts and
minds of the American public and Congress. In terms of military threats, there
was a general expectation that the Navy would be able to defeat any challenge
from the land or sea.
The Return of Naval Strategy
The September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed
Americans what can happen when forward presence fails to deter or defeat
attacks upon the United States. The U.S. military, including forward-deployed
naval forces, did not place the slightest impediment in the path of the terrorists. In
the parlance of the Cold War, al Qaeda was able to engage in the diplomacy of
violence by directly attacking countervalue targets in the United States without
first defeating the U.S. defense establishment.10 At the price of a few hundred
thousand dollars and 19 lives, al Qaeda killed thousands of people, inflicted
billions of dollars worth of property damage, and negatively affected the national
economy.
Senior Navy officers no longer have to worry about public disinterest in
international affairs or a lack of support for a strong Navy. But they do need to
develop a new naval strategy to defeat the challenge posed by the emergence of
hostile nonstate actors and a variety of asymmetric threats to U.S. security. As
events would play out, the Navy did deliver on a decade’s worth of promises:
Navy carrier battlegroups and Marine amphibious ready groups quickly took the
fight to al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Given the distances involved, this was no small
accomplishment; one would hazard to guess that before September 2001, most
observers would have estimated that Afghanistan was beyond the reach of the
Navy. But because they are little more than the statement of the obvious,
strategies that simply extol the importance of forward presence have been
rendered obsolete by the events of September 11. Everyone now recognizes that
it is important to deal with the bad guys over there before they get over here. It is
up to naval officers to decide exactly where and how they intend to use existing
and planned forces to defend their fellow citizens and family members against
real threats to the security of the United States.
The idea that September 11 should force a complete overhaul of naval strategy,
however, would probably be viewed by senior Navy officers as alarmist or at best
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counterproductive. Some might dismiss the terrorist attacks launched by al Qaeda
as a bizarre or anomalous event. Why change everything because of the actions
of a bunch of fanatics? Given the devastating attacks inflicted on terrorists as
they ran for their lives in the hills and deserts of Afghanistan, the Navy also has
helped reduce the likelihood that similar attacks will occur in the future.
Terrorists, rogue states, or groups of lunatics can act up, but some officer might
argue that the real-time global surveillance and precision-guided munitions
incorporated in Navy operations will guarantee that they will not act up for long.
Yet the September attacks marked a new kind of warfare that is not only a
response to globalization but also is itself facilitated by globalization.
Globalization instills in people the idea that they should take their destiny into
their own hands. It also empowers and equips them to shape that destiny by
affecting world events. In an ironic twist, globalization has not only produced a
dangerous political backlash, but it has also produced a new actor—a syndicate
of religious fanatics, revolutionaries, and anarchists—to threaten directly U.S.
security. The fact that the Navy dominates the world’s oceans did not matter
September 11. That data point alone should cause a reassessment of naval
strategy.
Origins of the New Challenges
The September attacks have cast the relationship between naval strategy and
globalization in a new light. While naval strategists focused on the diplomatic,
military, and economic implications of globalization, the information revolution
was producing a profound social transformation and skill revolution among
individuals who were lucky enough to gain access to the new information
technologies. Bill Gates, for instance, has not hidden his hope that individuals will
be empowered when they gain access to computers and the Internet. He
suggested that the Internet would give individuals capabilities only possessed by
bureaucracies less than a generation ago, thereby transforming the world.11 In a
series of analyses written over the last decade, James Rosenau also has identified
“four flows of influence” that are transforming social and political relationships:
(1) a technological revolution has facilitated the rapid flow of ideas, information,
pictures, and money across continents; (2) a transportation revolution has
hastened the boundary-spanning flow of elites, ordinary folk, and whole
populations; (3) an organizational revolution has shifted the flow of authority,
influence, and power beyond traditional boundaries; and (4) an economic
revolution has redirected the flow of goods, services and capital, and ownership
among countries.12
Naval strategy has responded to Rosenau’s fourth flow of influence: forward
presence was often justified as a way to facilitate the flow of goods, services, and
capital among countries. Naval doctrine also was intended to capitalize on the
technological revolution: Net-Centric Operations and FORCEnet concepts will
integrate new technologies into existing ships and aircraft.13 Planners and
strategists, however, paid little attention to the second and third influence flows
mentioned by Rosenau, the ones that had the greatest impact on individuals.
Globalization and the information revolution had combined to give average
individuals the ability to become actors on the world stage, a role once reserved
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for the brilliant, rich, fortunate, or truly evil.
Evidence of the transportation revolution and the breakdown of traditional
authority relationships is everywhere, but it never received much attention from
Navy planners. The decrease in the cost and increase in the availability of
intercontinental jet transportation might pose a problem for customs officers or
health officials, but it was not a matter of strategic consequence for the Navy.
Similarly, the Navy, when compared to other sectors of American society, was
probably less affected by the breakdown in traditional authority and the way new
computer and communication technology empowered individuals. Senior officers
had staff that could shield them from the leveling effects produced by the
availability of e-mail and the Internet. Navy tradition produced important
continuities in shipboard life, despite the introduction of co-ed crews and the
ability of individual sailors to maintain private global communication networks
while at sea. Throughout the rest of society, by contrast, leaders in business,
education, or government lacked the resources or traditions needed to shield them
from the direct communications and increased scrutiny of their employees or
constituents. As the distance between the leaders and the led shrinks, officials
find it increasingly difficult to use their bureaucratic position to justify their
decisions or to deflect criticism. The mystique of leadership is undermined by
accessibility and transparency. E-mail facilitates networks, not hierarchical
communications. We are all on a first name basis on the Internet.
Navy officers along with most individuals failed to recognize that there is an
ideology (or a logic, so to speak) embedded in every technology. This ideology
affects the way individuals are likely to employ a given technology and the
long-term effects a new technology is likely to have on society.14 Sometimes the
inventor of the technology recognizes and understands this ideology: Bill Gates
hoped that his work would have a revolutionary impact on society. More often,
the inventor of a machine is unaware of the logic inherent in the technology he or
she is creating. Gutenberg was a Catholic, but his printing press made the
Protestant Reformation possible because printing facilitates the dissemination of
competing ideas (that is, heresy).15 The automobile transformed America
—dispersing extended families, creating suburbs and new American cultures.16
But the automobile’s effects were perceived only when the transformation of
society was under way.
The Internet and the personal computer empower people by giving them the
ability to process data and communicate globally at virtually no cost, capabilities
that only states or enormous bureaucracies (for example, the Internal Revenue
Service) possessed as late as the 1980s. The fact that people, not just states, have
the technology needed to begin to overcome time and distance in communication
will have a profound effect on international relations. Access to the Internet
allows people to coordinate activities globally, to gather detailed information
about local conditions and infrastructure for just about anywhere on the planet,
and to move financial resources at virtually no cost. Powerful tools have been
placed in the hands of individuals, and as September 11 demonstrated, they will
not necessarily be put to good use.
Globalization and the information revolution have produced two profound
changes in the international security environment. First, they have created new
mediums of global communication. The Internet, global satellite television,
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transnational financial flows, international jet travel, and a host of grassroots
organizations and informal networks of individuals have emerged to link people
together in faraway places. Although the world’s oceans remain as the dominant
means of communication in terms of the flow of goods and trade, they no longer
are the dominant way in which people, ideas, or even wealth move across
borders.17 Unlike maritime communications, which are best exploited by nations
or large corporations (oceangoing vessels constitute a significant capital
investment), nonstate actors and individuals can easily exploit these new methods
of communication. Globalization itself suggests that nation states and their
military instruments no longer dominate emerging transnational networks.
Second, people have come to believe that they ought to make use of these new
technologies to take matters into their own hands. The ideology embodied in the
new communication and data processing tools shapes individual and collective
behavior in a way that empowers individuals and groups at the expense of
governments or bureaucracies. Rosenau, for example, has written extensively
about how the information revolution and globalization have produced a global
authority crisis as traditional institutions are now undermined by the changing
behavior and expectations of individuals. From Madison Avenue comes the
message that the information revolution not only can be used to empower the
consumer, but it can also level the playing field between the corporation and the
individual when it comes to investing on Wall Street, buying a car, or shopping
for a home mortgage.
These empowered individuals and groups create a new challenge for naval
strategists. As chapter 1 notes, while armies control territory, navies control
access to territory and communications. Navies, according to Tangredi, are the
portions of military forces that operate “in the fluid mediums that humans use for
information, transportation, and exchange but cannot normally inhabit. Its prime
purpose is to ensure or deny access.”18 Prior to September 11, the Navy failed to
deny access to these new mediums of communication and al Qaeda took
advantage of that opening. Globalization and the information revolution have
created new kinds of electronic oceans, and millions of individuals, groups, and
organizations have moved quickly to exploit them for their own purposes.
Defending America
Homeland defense strikes fear in the hearts of naval officers everywhere,
conjuring up images of maritime patrols along America’s coasts, ships’ crews
being turned out to form naval infantry, and the transformation of the Navy into a
Coast Guard auxiliary. Admittedly, the clamor for homeland defense casts doubt
on much of the naval strategy of the 1990s because the political and military basis
for strategy has changed in the aftermath of September 11. Before the tragedy,
Navy strategists were forced constantly to explain fundamental maritime
concepts to a disinterested public and Congress. After the tragedy, Navy
strategists now face a far more difficult problem; they must explain to an alarmed
U.S. public and Congress how they intend to protect average Americans from the
murderous assaults of fanatics. They must devise a way of patrolling and
protecting, so to speak, the new mediums of communication that were exploited
with devastating effect by al Qaeda.
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How can a carrier battlegroup steaming across the Pacific Ocean affect the way
someone in Paris, Kabul, or Hong Kong uses a computer? How can the Navy
decrease the appeal of millenarians who preach salvation through violence? How
can the Navy disrupt and destroy shadowy networks of state and nonstate actors
who conspire to kill Americans and discredit the United States? These are
important questions, but there are no readily available answers. It will take time
and some creative thinking to bring to bear existing Navy assets to counter
emerging transnational threats. But U.S. sailors and marines have accomplished
extraordinarily difficult missions—such as storming heavily defended beaches,
tracking hostile submarines, and landing on pitching flight decks—that are
considered nearly impossible (or prohibitively dangerous) by other navies. What
is needed is an honest appraisal of the threat facing the United States and a
sustained effort to devise ways to direct naval power against America’s enemies.
In bringing naval power to bear against emerging threats, planners would do well
to keep several principles in mind as they contemplate future strategy. First, it
makes no sense for naval strategists to ignore the events of September 2001 by
simply restating the benefits provided by forward presence. Suggestions that the
Navy “does not do homeland defense” or that the Navy should concentrate on
the “away game” will only generate public and Congressional hostility. Instead,
senior officers and officials must state repeatedly that the primary mission of the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps is to protect America, its allies, and its interests
overseas. People are less interested in how the Navy accomplishes this primary
mission than in the fact that the Navy and Marines are doing everything in their
power to keep fellow citizens and friends safe. Strategists should avoid
highlighting the particular military benefits provided by global maritime
dominance (a theme repeatedly stated during the 1990s) and concentrate instead
on specific missions that the Navy can undertake to protect the United States.19
Second, the ability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to project power on short
notice to distant parts of the planet was demonstrated clearly in the war against
the Taliban and al Qaeda. Navy ability to conduct and support joint operations
(here the use of the USS Kitty Hawk as a special operations platform comes to
mind) was evident during the battle in Afghanistan. The Navy also demonstrated
an outstanding ability to make use of real-time intelligence and to employ
extensively precision-guided weapons. But all of these capabilities need to be
enhanced greatly so that naval forces can more effectively and quickly attack a
vast array of targets.
If Navy officers and Marines want to continue to provide the primary short-
notice strike capability available to the United States (a primary mission in the
war against terrorism), they need to exploit new technologies (to improve
networks, sensors, weapons, and platforms), strategies, and tactics, especially in
the effort to attack very small targets at great distances. For example, aircraft
carriers should be supplied with long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that
can linger over a target for hours or days, looking for targets of opportunity. New
long-range precision strike weapons—such as missiles, cruise missiles, or perhaps
even UAVs—need to be developed for surface combatants and submarines so
that they too can take advantage of real-time intelligence and support ground
operations. In other words, the Navy already possesses a significant capability to
deliver sustained precision strikes against large target sets given a few weeks
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notice. What it needs to develop now is a capability to deliver limited long-range
strikes (against a manufacturing complex, a terrorist cell meeting in a specific
location, or even a lone individual) in real time.
Third, to combat the rise of nonstate opponents, the Navy needs to exploit
weapons and technologies that are not painted gray and offer no opportunity for
command at sea. Coast Guard captain Stephen Flynn in a recent article in
Foreign Affairs, for example, has identified a relatively inexpensive method to
identify suspicious containers among the millions of containers annually carried
by ship into the United States. According to Flynn, if the world’s shipping
megaports (Long Beach, Los Angeles, Hong Kong, Singapore, Hamburg,
Antwerp, and Rotterdam 20) implemented a standard security and tracking
system, smaller port facilities would be forced to adopt the system. It then would
be relatively easy to use computers, global positioning system (GPS)
transponders, and electronic tags to track containers. Possible instances of
tampering or shipments from shadowy locations could be identified. Navy
warships could then target suspicious vessels far from America’s shores.21 This
sort of system would actually constitute a naval presence in the specific portion
of cyberspace that controls the commercial movement of goods around the globe.
Both state and nonstate actors are making use of off-the-shelf technologies to
achieve objectives. Navy planners must make use of the same technologies to
develop a presence in the same mediums of communication exploited by
America’s enemies.
Fourth, Navy planners should stop to consider an important counterfactual
question: what would have happened if the terrorists had struck the three carriers
docked in Norfolk, Virginia, on September 11, 2001? They must consider the
threat of asymmetric attacks intended to cripple U.S. military capabilities before
they can be brought to battle. There is little that nonstate actors can do to stop a
carrier battlegroup as it moves across the Pacific Ocean, but there are many ways
terrorists armed with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons might achieve
a mission kill against vital assets. In fact, scholars have recently called attention
to the fact that surprise and asymmetric strategies hold an often exaggerated and
unrealistic appeal to weaker parties in a conflict who hope, by striking a critical
node, they can attack the will of their stronger opponents.22 Navy officers also
must embrace the fundamental idea behind force protection: the distinction
between the threat involved in combat operations and peacetime is vanishing.
Navy officers died at their desks in the Pentagon during peacetime; by contrast,
combat operations over the skies of Afghanistan mercifully proved to be less
lethal for the Navy. Al Qaeda sought to target the Navy in Singapore, a place that
appeared to be a safe haven as carrier battlegroups transited to the war zone. For
the moment, at least, America’s enemies intend to engage U.S. military forces not
on some recognized battlefield, but when and where we least expect it.
Conclusion
Will globalization sink the Navy? The answer to the question is no, but
globalization and the information revolution have produced a challenging set of
circumstances. Like the rise of aviation, new mediums of communication have
emerged over the last 20 years that have complicated the ability of navies to
control access to a country’s shores. The terrorist attacks launched against the
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United States in the fall of 2001 demonstrated that nonstate actors are willing to
make use of these mediums to achieve their objectives. The opportunities and
trends unleashed by the information revolution and globalization will only
multiply and accelerate in the years ahead. Navy planners must devise ways to
respond to the real security challenges that are now clearly on America’s strategic
horizon.
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